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Two thousand years ago, Germanic tribesmen ambushed and annihilated three crack Roman legions thereby irrevocably altering the course of Western civilization. However, you’re not supposed to know about the consequences of this Battle of the Teutoburg Forest because it’s not politically correct.
Political correctness: definition – the notion that you can pick up a turd by the clean end.
“The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history.” – George Orwell
There is considerable information about this battle on the internet and in texts. Some of the information is fairly accurate and some not. One can expect this from an event that occurred 2,000 years ago. After all, we’re still debating the origin of Christianity that dates from the same period.
However, you will find little information on this battle’s effect on the subsequent history of Western civilization. You’ll find even less about this monumental battle’s importance to all of us today and how it continues to shape our culture, our economies and ultimately, our future. That’s why it’s helpful to know about the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Current events and my future articles on Islam depend on an understanding of the ancient battle and its consequences.
Ann Landers once said that no one can take advantage of you without your permission. That’s accurate to a point, but it’s too glib! It assumes you have the necessary knowledge to identify manipulation. If you’re ignorant of your roots, you are by definition rootless and blowing in the wind. If you don’t know where you’re coming from, how can you navigate where you’re going? This article examines where we came from and where we’re going.
This article is the first of a three-part series. A future post will cover another, little-understood mental bias called False Consensus Effect whereby we assume other people think and feel like us. Thus, with the best of intentions, we willingly open the gates to the barbarians. In the third post, we’ll discover that historians have deceived us and not for the first time. It was not the Germanic barbarians that destroyed the Roman Empire; it was the Islamic barbarians that invaded after the Germanic barbarians.
However, first, we need to examine how the Germanic chieftain Arminius defeated the Romans, halted the spread of the Roman Empire and saved Western civilization in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Once we see this, we can understand the effect Islam later had on the Roman Empire.
Note: as a skeptic (I try to believe nothing) I ought to use secular calendar era abbreviations CE (Common Era or Current Era) and BCE (Before the Common Era). However, I’m more familiar with BC (Before Christ) and AD (Anno Domini) as are many other readers, so I’ll continue using the old methods (BC & AD) for simplicity and to avoid unnecessary mental gyrations with every date.
THE BATTLE OF THE TEUTOBURG FOREST
This battle, in what is today Northwestern Germany, goes by many names such as the Varus Battle (Clades Variana) and several German variations. To call it a ‘Battle’ is somewhat of a misnomer; it would be more apt to call it an Ambush or a Massacre as I shall demonstrate.
The modern day map below shows the location of the Teutoburg Forest in present-day Germany.
The Teutoburg Forest (Teutoburger Wald in German) is a “rugged range of low-lying mountains covered in forests and swamps in the modern-day regions of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia.” (39C) The mountain range was formerly called ‘Osning’ (32) and wasn’t named Teutoburg Forest until the 19th century.
One of the central characters in this battle was Arminius (18/17 BC – AD 21) whose real Germanic name is lost in the mists of time. The Romans called him Arminius and centuries later; his name was ‘re-Germanized’ to Hermann (likely inaccurately). “The Germanic name of Arminius is not known. It is known that in his royal Cheruskan family eight members bore names with the prefix Segi (Sieg) like his father Segimer, a brother-in-law Segimund. So Arminius’ Germanic name could have been Segifried (Siegfried).” (58)
In 1875, a large statue of Arminius was erected near Detmold, Germany because it was then thought to be the site of this long-forgotten battle. However, subsequent archaeological excavations have shown the battle site was, in fact, Kalkreise.
In addition to the Detmold statue, a similar Hermann Heights Monument was erected in the U.S. at New Ulm, Minnesota and another at Hermann, Missouri. As well, there have been numerous paintings, novels, plays and operas dedicated to Arminius/Hermann all which of has spineless, politically correct moderns quaking in their boots as we shall see.
Arminius, along with his brother Flavus were sent to Rome as tribute by their father, a chieftain of the Cherusci tribe. There, Arminius spent his youth as a hostage where he received a military education, fought with distinction for the Romans and was awarded the rank of Equestrian (one level below Senator) when Emperor Tiberius ‘Knighted’ him in 4 AD. (1) (55)
Edward Creasy writes, “It was part of the subtle policy of Rome to confer rank and privileges on the youth of the leading families in the nations which she wished to enslave.” (25) Arminius was, “the kind of man the Romans relied on to help their armies penetrate the lands of the barbarians.” (1)
FROM LEGEND TO FACT
For almost 2,000 years the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest was a legend unsupported by archeology. That changed when Tony Clunn of Britain’s Royal Tank Regiment arrived at his new posting at Osnabrück, Germany in the spring of 1987. As an amateur archeologist when off-duty, he hoped to use his metal detector to find ancient Roman artifacts. He found more than coins. He found the remains of this ancient battle at Kalkreise. (1) (3) (55)
BEFORE THE BATTLE
To the Romans, anyone who wasn’t Roman was a ‘barbarian’. At the time, the German barbarians lived in tribal communities with a strong warrior ethos in densely wooded, central Europe unlike their more urban southern neighbors in Gaul (today France). (55)
Germany as a united nation did not exist for another eighteen centuries. The Smithsonian writes that “Various Teutonic tribes lay scattered across a vast wilderness that reached from present-day Holland to Poland. The Romans knew little of this densely forested territory governed by fiercely independent chieftains. They would pay dearly for their ignorance.” (1) (42) The Romans called it “Germania” although “the name referred originally to a particular tribe along the Rhine.” According to Rick Archer, “Germania, as the Romans called it, and which, considering its origin and name in its original language, should be called Teutonia, is the only country in Europe and maybe the universe that was never subjugated by Rome.” (38)
Before this, Caesar had already conquered Gaul and held Germanic areas southwest of the Rhine River. Between 4 and 6 BC, Roman legions mounted repeated incursions into the tribal lands and established several bases on the Lippe and Weser rivers. (1) The Roman general Tiberius, who would later become emperor, subjugated several Germanic tribes south of the Teutoburg Forest. “The Romans were holding portions of it — not entire regions, but merely such districts as happened to have been subdued…” (16)
Cassius Dio (164-c.235) wrote that “The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways … They had not, however, forgotten their ancestral habits, their native manners, their old life of independence, or the power derived from arms.
“Hence, so long as they were unlearning these customs gradually and by the way, as one may say, under careful watching, they were not disturbed by the change in their manner of life, and were becoming different without knowing it.” (26)
Völuspá.org (39) is a website for the studies of “Forn Seðr ‘Old Customs’, Heritage, Culture and Lore of various Germanic Tribes.” They write that “Having witnessed the brutality of the Romans toward the Gaulish people and the loss of life and property, many of the Germanic people felt they did not want the same fate to fall upon them.” (39A)
And then, a rebellion broke out in the Roman province of Illyricum (today, the Balkans) and Tiberius was forced to send his eight legions there to deal with the uprising. (3) To replace Tiberius, in 7 A.D. Emperor Augustus assigned the Imperial Roman legate Publius Quinctilius Varus to consolidate the new province of Germania in 7 A.D. (51) (53) (55). Conquering it may have been a prestige project for Augustus to gain legitimacy like his predecessor, Julius Caesar, who had conquered Gaul. (37) If so, it would backfire.
Varus was “linked by marriage to the imperial family and had served as Emperor Augustus’ representative in the province of Syria” (1) which included Judea where he was known for his harsh rule, high taxes and the crucifixion of 2,000 Hebrew rebels. (33) It was said that he “entered the rich province a poor man, but left it a rich man and the province poor.” (27)
Benario writes that “Varus was a very good administrator, but he was not a soldier … To send him out into an unconquered land and tell him to make a province of it was a huge blunder on Augustus’ part.” (1) “… When Varus became governor of Germania, “he strove to change them more rapidly. Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations. To this they were in no mood to submit. “ (26)
Creasy writes that Varus was “Accustomed to govern the depraved and debased natives of Syria, a country where courage in man, and virtue in woman, had for centuries been unknown, Varus thought that he might gratify his licentious and rapacious passions with equal impunity among the high-minded sons and pure-spirited daughters of Germany. When the general of an army sets the example of outrages of this description, he is soon faithfully imitated by his officers, and surpassed by his still more brutal soldiery.” (25) This would not be Varus’s last in a litany of mistakes and misjudgments.
“Florus, Cassius Dio and Paterculus suggest that the taxes provoked resistance among a population that was at first willing to accept Roman rule. They agree that Varus did not see the gathering storm … The rebels (or freedom fighters, depending on one’s perspective) must have made their preparation during the late summer.” (14)
And, it was more than just taxation. Völuspá.org writes that this was “a time in Germania when the Germanic tribes faced their greatest threat, of annexation by Rome and the consequent loss of their freedom, language, culture and heritage.” (39B)
Only the three legions XVII, XVIII and XIX, were available to Varus because the Balkan revolt drew in many of the available Roman legions. Varus also commanded six cohorts of auxiliary troops and three squadrons of cavalry (55) although the latter lacked battlefield experience. (51)
“Arminius … was assigned to the legions of Varus as a trusted advisor, but in secret he plotted with the German tribes to attack the Roman legions.” (53) “Arminius saw the oppression of the Germanic tribes and secretly sought to bring together an alliance of the Cherusci, Marsi, Chatti and Bructeri people. Traditional enemies were united in outrage at the financial burdens put upon them by the Empire.” (51)
Arminius’ motives are obscure, and some historians believe he may have had dreams of becoming a Germanic king. (1) What is known is that he was averse to Romans’ treatment, taxation, and brutality of his people.
Arminius and his father Segimer were Varus’s constant companions and often dined together. (26) Varus “accordingly became confident, and expecting no harm … refused to believe all those who suspected what was going on …” (26) This, too, would be another of Varus’s misjudgments.
Having been trained by the Roman military, Arminius understood that the Germanic tribesmen were no match for the Romans’ traditional military tactics on the open ground. He needed to overcome Roman discipline, tactics, and their superior weaponry. (14) He needed to draw the legionnaires out of open fields and onto irregular ground and dense forest where they couldn’t employ their traditional military tactics. Only by adopting guerilla tactics could an unconventional force like the Germans defeat the experienced and professional Roman Legionaries.
THE ROMAN ARMY
The Roman army was noted for standardization, systematization, engineering, strong discipline and a ruthless persistence. “A legionary typically carried around 27 kilograms (60 pounds) of armor, weapons, and equipment…” (1) “Their primary weapons were spears, but they also used the gladius, a short two-edged sword that was well suited for thrusting, slashing, blocking, and parrying. They also carried rectangular shields that, when locked together in formation, made them almost invulnerable to attack. They used a battle formation known as the maniple, similar to the Macedonian phalanx, but looser and more flexible and therefore effective on a variety of terrains.” (35)
“The Germans lacked the discipline of the Romans, and their steel was of inferior quality. But they possessed more than size, strength, and courage in battle. The army consisted of all able-bodied freemen, and they fought with shields, spears, battle-axes, and occasionally large broadswords, more powerful than the Roman gladius but more difficult to use in close infighting. They commonly attacked using a wedge formation, and cowardice in battle was punishable by death. They fought with machine-like efficiency in smaller groups but were unused to fighting together in large armies.” (35)
That is, until Arminius united them and led them into battle.
AMBUSH AND MASSACRE
“There are four authors whose accounts of the battle in the Teutoburg Forest survives. Their value is questionable because none of them was an eyewitness of the Roman defeat, but they all use older sources which can be shown to be (near-)contemporary.” (14) Romans such as Cassius Dio, Tacitus and Paterculus wrote about this battle (55) as did Publius Annius Florus (14)
Any description of a battle 2,000 years ago is, by necessity, conjectural. They say that the victors write the history books. In this case, history was written by the losers who happen to be literate (Romans) and not the victors (Germans) because the Germans were still illiterate at that time.
It was not uncommon for Roman Emperors to have their chroniclers re-write their predecessors’ histories to make themselves look better in comparison. As well, Romans writing immediately after the ‘Varus Disaster’ had to be careful what they said to avoid jeopardizing their livelihoods or offending those still living. Being closer to the event might have given them more accuracy, but that had to be tempered with circumspection whereas later writers’ incomes and health didn’t depend on pleasing a deceased Emperor.
It’s not surprising that an event 2,000 years in the past still generates many questions and not a few disagreements among scholars including the battle’s exact location. Der Spiegel reports that “Some historians still have their doubts about Kalkriese, but they are now in the minority because the certainty that this is the true battlefield has grown steadily over the last two decades.” (8) As Mike Anderson says, “Lack of details does not change the major facts of the battle or its significance, however.” (53)
In any case, having returned to his tribe in 7 AD, Arminius had two years to form an alliance among Germanic tribes to build earthen fortifications at an ambush site. This also allowed time for the fortifications to return to a natural, undisturbed state thus camouflaging it to the Roman Legions. (39A) The wall had gates and passageways for the Germanic warriors to enter and withdraw from the battlefield. “It also had a drain to prevent the rains from washing it away.” (58)
Arminius sprang his trap in September, 9 AD when Varus and his army were on their way back to winter quarters. (41) (55) Arminius convinced Varus, to take his legions on a more northern route to supposedly quell a rebellion. There was no rebellion; it was a ruse.
Guided by Germanic auxiliaries, the route took the Romans into unfamiliar territory. “Confidently Varus marched on, still believing that Germania had been pacified and this was nothing more than a minor rebellion; as with many other Roman commanders they believed in using a show of force to give the locals second thoughts in rebellion; there is little doubt Varus believed this is what he was doing … ” (39C)
The Romans set off in a casual march because they saw this as a routine mission. “Having campaigned all summer, it is likely the soldiers were growing weary and looked forward to the more relaxing winter encampments along the Rhine. This weariness may have contributed greatly to not observing their surroundings for signs of ambushes.” (39C) Besides, “the Romans,” says Wells, “thought they were invincible.” (1) Ultimately, Rome vastly underestimated the “barbarians” they faced. (29)
Dios writes that “The Romans, even before the enemy assailed them, were having a hard time of it felling trees, building roads … They had with them many waggons and many beasts of burden as in time of peace … and a large retinue of servants were following them – one more reason for their advancing in scattered groups. Meanwhile a violent rain and wind came up that separated them still further, while the ground, that had become slippery around the roots and logs, made walking very treacherous for them…” In the driving storm, the tops of old-growth trees would break and fall causing confusion and creating what modern loggers call ‘widow-makers.’
Even with Roman axe-men felling trees, their roadway would have been narrow so they would have been stretched out in a long, thin and very vulnerable column. The terrain became more arduous and the forest denser. The line of march stretched out perilously long.
When the army reached a point northeast of Osnabruck, they were ambushed. Dio says that Arminius had asked to be excused to check on auxiliaries but instead met up with the Germans to set up the attack.
“While the Romans were in such difficulties, the barbarians suddenly surrounded them on all sides at once, coming through the densest thickets, as they were acquainted with the paths. At first they hurled their volleys from a distance; then, as no one defended himself and many were wounded, they approached closer to them. For the Romans were not proceeding in any regular order, but were mixed in helter-skelter with the waggons and the unarmed, and so, being unable to form readily anywhere in a body, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.” (26)
“Roman armies were geared for set battles of mass maneuver, not for the guerilla warfare they would encounter in the rough terrain of a northern European old growth forest, just like the British and Hessian troops of King George III discovered in the dense old growth woods of the American back country during the Revolution.” (53)
The battle was a regular ambush affected on a large scale. (55) Usually, undisciplined barbarians “generally vented their fury in the first onslaught: after that they could be butchered. Arminius plan was to keep the Romans on the defensive and allow his men to sustain their assault.” (55) The German strategy was to pin the Romans into a tight area of unforgiving forest and marshy terrain in which they could not execute their usual combat tactics. (29)
“Since they were marching in close formation and few could see much beyond the men immediately around them, those behind kept marching forward and crashed into their fellows. At first, soldiers farther back in the column were unaware of what was happening toward the front, and they kept pressing on.… Like a chain-reaction highway crash, men piled into one another.…” (35)
This is similar to military tactics known as “defeat in detail” (34) where attacking units are strengthened by proximity to supporting units. The attackers exploit the failure of defenders to coordinate and support their units under attack as well as taking advantage of defenders’ lack of communication with their commanders.
“Wounded, dying, and already dead men quickly covered the track, making movement increasingly difficult for the others. The scene was one of complete chaos — spears falling like hail, men collapsing and gasping, even those not yet wounded struggling to remain on their feet, and occasionally frenzied horses and mules crashing through the swarm of troops. Within minutes, thousands of Roman soldiers lay dead or dying, pierced by spears, while others struggled to stay on their feet and to use their shields for shelter.” (35)
One major disagreement among historians is the duration of the battle. “Was it a long, drawn-out, three or four-day affair or was it a single furious assault?” (55) Roman historians may have stretched it out to show the Roman army in a more favorable light.
Accurate Roman accounts of the battle are scarce because the totality of the defeat produced so few survivors and they were ordinary soldiers lacking the overall perspective of the commanders. (14) “The discrepancies reflect their different positions during the chaotic battle, and are in fact proof that our authors are not simply repeating imperial propaganda.” (14)
Velleius Paterculus writes the battle lasted three days while Dios says four days. Despite Arminius’s strong leadership, it would be surprising if the undisciplined Germanic tribesmen could have held it together for so many days on end. In any case, the results speak for themselves.
Der Spiegel writes that “Traces of fighting have been found in a wide area around Kalkriese, which ties in with accounts by Roman historians that the battle lasted four days and began with ambushes on the thin column of legionnaires and supplies that stretched 15 kilometers along narrow forest paths.” (8)
The rain soaked and loosened the sinew strings of the Roman bows rendering them useless. Their wood and hardened leather shields became waterlogged and cumbersome as well as soft and vulnerable.
“Their opponents, on the other hand, being for the most part lightly equipped, and able to approach and retire freely, suffered less from the storm. Furthermore, the enemy’s forces had greatly increased, as many of those who had at first wavered joined them, largely in the hope of plunder, and thus they could more easily encircle and strike down the Romans, whose ranks were now thinned, many having perished in the earlier fighting.” (26)
In brief, the Romans were in unfamiliar territory, trapped in a rough and wooded terrain in a driving rainstorm, unable to execute standard military tactics and double-crossed by allies communicating with the enemy. They were confined to a narrow gap between the woods, a 350-foot high hill (Kalkreise) and the swampland at the edge of the Great Bog. “From a tactical standpoint there is no way the Roman Army could have survived this ‘perfect storm’ of tactical obstacles.” (53)
Arminius deliberately chose the season, the route and the terrain to maximize the Germans’ advantage and minimize the Romans’. From his Roman military experience, Arminius knew that the Legionnaires would be weary from a long summer of campaigning. As well, he recognized and capitalized on Varus’s incompetence as a General.
There was ample time that summer for the tribesmen to have dug a trench and construct a zig-zag wall about 500 yards in length. Arminius’ understanding of Roman military tactics and their weak points was evident in the archaeological discovery “of a wall 4 feet high and 12 feet thick, built of sand and reinforced by chunks of sod … The wall zigzagged so that the Germans on top of it could attack the Romans from two angles. They could stand on the wall, or rush out through gaps in it to attack the Roman flank, and then run back behind it for safety. Concentrations of artifacts were found in front of the wall, suggesting that the Romans had tried to scale it. The dearth of objects behind it testifies to their failure to do so.” (1)
Paterculus writes that, “Hemmed in by forests and marshes and ambuscades, it was exterminated almost to a man by the very enemy whom it had always slaughtered like cattle, whose life or death had depended solely upon the wrath or the pity of the Romans.” (27) It was indeed a slaughter. “Roman casualties have been estimated at 15,000–20,000 dead…” (3) Estimates … peak at 25,000.” (51) “All Roman accounts stress the completeness of the Roman defeat.” (3)
Varus’ other mistakes and misjudgments include:
– Rival chieftain Segestes who was Arminius’ father-in-law, warned Varus of Arminius plans, but Varus trusted Arminius and dismissed the allegations as a continuation of a personal feud between Arminius and Segestes. (1) (51)
– He expected no ambush and thus did not send out reconnaissance parties ahead of his troops. (3) (51)
– He positioned his legions where their fighting strengths were minimized, and those of the Germanic tribesmen maximized (33)
Varus, “the wrong man in the wrong place” (31) making his last misjudgment took his life by falling on his sword in the prescribed Roman tradition. Ironically, his father, with the same name Sextus Quinctilius Varus, had also committed suicide (33) after the Battle of Philippi. and, according to Paterculus, so too had his Grandfather died before him. (27) “Varus, therefore, and all the more prominent officers, fearing that they should either be captured alive or be killed by their bitterest foes (for they had already been wounded), made bold to do a thing that was terrible yet unavoidable: they took their own lives.” (26) Thus Varus’s suicide left his men leaderless and destroyed what little morale and discipline they had left.
“When news of this had spread, none of the rest, even if he had any strength left, defended himself any longer. Some imitated their leader, and others, casting aside their arms, allowed anybody who pleased to slay them; for to flee was impossible …” (26)
“Only a handful of survivors managed somehow to escape into the forest and make their way to safety. The news they brought home so shocked the Romans that many ascribed it to supernatural causes …” (1)
Stay tuned for Part 2 where we examine:
The Battle’s Aftermath
Modern-day consequences of the Battle
Spineless Ass Media
Who Rules Us?
It’s going to get very interesting and extremely politically incorrect.
August 1, 2016
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(1) The Ambush That Changed History
(3) Battle of the Teutoburg Forest explained
(6) Arminius (Badass of the Week)
(7) Battle of Arausio
(8) Battle of the Teutoburg Forest: Germany Recalls Myth That Created the Nation
(10) Fox Eyes Roman-Era German Hero ‘Arminius’
(14) The battle in the Teutoburg Forest
(16) The Battle of Teutoburg Forest
(17) Battle of the Teutoburg Forest – Conflict & Date:
(18) THE GERMAN-ROMAN WAR
(21) Romans win battle of teutoburg forest: What is the result.
(22) The Romans in Ancient Germany – A 2000th Anniversary
(25) The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World/Chapter V
(26) Cassius Dio on the battle in the Teutoburg forest
(27) Paterculus on the Battle in the Teutoburg Forest
(29) THE BATTLE THAT STOPPED ROME
(32) Teutoburg Forest Explained
(33) Publius Quinctilius Varus Explained
(34) Defeat in detail explained
(35) Teutoburg Forest: The Battle That Saved the West
(37) Why did the battle of Teutoburg Forest have such an impact on Roman expansion into Germany?
(38) A Look at the History of Germany – Rick Archer
(39A) Build-up to war
(39B) The Germans
(39C) Teutoburg Forest
(39D) The Spoils of War
(39E) Impact after the Battle
(39F) Modern Impact
(40) Rome In The Teutoburg Forest
(41) Annex A: Battle of the Teutoburg Forest between Paderborn Plateau and Haar
(42) Once Upon a Time The Battle Of The Teutoburg Forest
(44) ROME IN THE TEUTOBURG FOREST by James L. Venckus, LCDR (PDF)
(51) Battle of Teutoburg Forest
(53) Massacre at the Teutoburg Forest by Mike Anderson
(58) The Varus Battle (Clades Variana)
The Roman Empire and It’s Germanic Peoples – Wolfram, Herwig, tr. by Dunlap, Thomas
The Battle That Stopped Rome – University of Minnesota specialist in Iron Age European archaeology, Peter S. Wells
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest – Wikipedia
(27) Paterculus on the Battle in the Teutoburg Forest Velleius Paterculus (c. 20 BCE – after 30 CE) Roman officer, senator, and scholar, author of a brief Roman History.
In his Roman History, the Roman officer-historian Velleius Paterculus (20 BCE – after 30 CE) has included a description of the battle in the Teutoburg Forest (September 9 CE). The author was active in the Germanic wars and knew many of the actors personally. His account is the oldest surviving description of the battle and relies on eyewitness accounts; the battlefield has been discovered at Kalkriese.
SOURCES NOT USED
(2) Book review: The Battle That Stopped Rome by Peter S. Wells
(5) Duplicate of (4) Arminius Explained
(9) Questionable source – Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
(11) Current affairs, not relevant to the article – Merkel Confronts Facebook’s Zuckerberg Over Policing Hate Posts
(12) Summary of Der Spiegel article (8) – Germany Recalls Myth That Created the Nation
(13) Book review – How the eagles were tamed http://www.spectator.co.uk/2004/03/how-the-eagles-were-tamed/
(15) – Biased source – The Return of the Warrior… Rise Arminius! HTTP://THINKTRIBALLY.ORG/ARTICLE/THE-RETURN-OF-THE-WARRIOR-RISE-ARMINIUS/
(19) – Unreliable source – Teutoburg Forest – The Worst Defeat in Roman History http://historum.com/ancient-history/42-teutoburg-forest-worst-defeat-roman-history.html
(20) Current affairs – not relevant to this article – Germans needed for National Geographic filming! http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/thread-5951.html
(23) Readers’ comments – What prevented the Romans from conquering, or at least colonizing present-day Germany?
(24) Repeat of Creasy (25) – The Great Events by Famous Historians/Volume 2/Germans under Arminius Revolt Against Rome
(28) Book review – Review of Peter S. Wells’ ‘The Battle That Stopped Rome’
(30) Another book review of Peter Wells’ book above
(36) Questionable source – The Decissive Battles of History: Ancient Battles –Teutoburg Forest (9 AD) http://histclo.com/essay/war/swc/bat/anc/bat-tf.html
(43) Book review – Rome’s Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest Paperback by Adrian Murdoch
(45) Battle of Teutoburg Forest Antimoon
(46) Quora reader’s comments – How did the Battle of Teutoburg Forest shape modern German history?
(48) Book summary – http://listverse.com/2015/09/06/10-tiny-things-that-nearly-changed-history/ Morris M. September 6, 2015
(49) Book review – Rewriting History: A Collection Of Essays Ponders The Possibilities If Things Hadn’t Happened The Way They Did
(50) Readers’ comments – Battle of tuetoberg forest essay
(52) The Teutoburg Massacre – End Game by Mike Anderson
(54) Readers’ comments – Why were the Romans unable to conquer Germania?
(55) Questionable source – IBDP battle of Teutoburg Forest
(56) Almost identical to Der Spiegel article (8) – Battle of the Teutoburg Forest Germany Recalls Myth That Created the Nation
(57) German Archaeologists Hail New Find – Discovery of Roman Battlefield Poses Historical Riddle
(60) Readers’ comments – Why were the Romans unable to conquer Germania?
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